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Abstract
Over the last decade, differential privacy has achieved widespread
adoption within the privacy community. Moreover, it has attracted
significant attention from the verification community, resulting in
several successful tools for formally proving differential privacy.
Although their technical approaches vary greatly, all existing tools
rely on reasoning principles derived from the composition theorem
of differential privacy. While this suffices to verify most common
private algorithms, there are several important algorithms whose
privacy analysis does not rely solely on the composition theorem.
Their proofs are significantly more complex, and are currently
beyond the reach of verification tools.
In this paper, we develop compositional methods for formally
verifying differential privacy for algorithms whose analysis goes
beyond the composition theorem. Our methods are based on deep
connections between differential privacy and probabilistic couplings,
an established mathematical tool for reasoning about stochastic
processes. Even when the composition theorem is not helpful, we
can often prove privacy by a coupling argument.
We demonstrate our methods on two algorithms: the Exponential
mechanism and the Above Threshold algorithm, the critical com-
ponent of the famous Sparse Vector algorithm. We verify these
examples in a relational program logic apRHL+, which can con-
struct approximate couplings. This logic extends the existing apRHL
logic with more general rules for the Laplace mechanism and the
one-sided Laplace mechanism, and new structural rules enabling
pointwise reasoning about privacy; all the rules are inspired by the
connection with coupling. While our paper is presented from a for-
mal verification perspective, we believe that its main insight is of
independent interest for the differential privacy community.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.3.1 [Specifying and Verify-
ing and Reasoning about Programs]
General Terms Differential privacy, probabilistic couplings
1. Introduction
Differential privacy is a rigorous definition of statistical privacy pro-
posed by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [14], and considered
to be the gold standard for privacy-preserving computations. Most
differentially private computations are built from two fundamental
tools: private primitives and composition theorems (see § 2). How-
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ever, there are several important examples whose privacy proofs go
beyond these tools, for instance:
• The Above Threshold algorithm, which takes a list of numerical
queries as input and outputs the first query whose answer
is above a certain threshold. Above Threshold is the critical
component of the Sparse Vector technique. (See, e.g., Dwork
and Roth [12].)
• The Report-noisy-max algorithm, which takes a list of numerical
queries as input and privately selects the query with the highest
answer. (See, e.g., Dwork and Roth [12].)
• The Exponential mechanism [27], which privately returns the
element of a (possibly non-numeric) range with the highest
score; this algorithm can be implemented as a variant of the
Report-noisy-max algorithm with a different noise distribution.
Unfortunately, existing pen-and-paper proofs of these algorithms
use ad hoc manipulations of probabilities, and as a consequence are
difficult to understand and error-prone.
This raises a natural question: can we develop compositional
proof methods for verifying differential privacy of these algorithms,
even though their proofs appear non-compositional? Surprisingly,
the answer is yes. Our method builds on two key insights.
1. A connection between probabilistic liftings and probabilistic
couplings [6].
2. A connection between differential privacy and approximate
liftings [2, 4], a generalization of probabilistic liftings used in
probabilistic process algebra [21].
Probabilistic liftings and couplings
Relation lifting is a well-studied construction in mathematics and
computer science. Abstractly, relation lifting transforms relations
R ⊆ A×B into relations R] ⊆ TA× TB, where T is a functor
over sets [1]. Relation lifting satisfies a type of composition, so it is
a natural foundation for compositional proof methods.
Relation lifting has historically been an important tool for
analyzing of probabilistic systems. For example, probabilistic lifting
specializes the notion of relation lifting for the probability monad,
and appears in standard definitions of probabilistic bisimulation.
Over the last 25 years, researchers have developed a wide variety of
tools for reasoning about probabilistic liftings, explored applications
in numerous areas including security and biology, and uncovered
deep connections with the Kantorovich metric and the theory of
optimal transport (for a survey, see Deng and Du [11]).
While research has traditionally considers probabilistic liftings
for partial equivalence relations, recent works investigate liftings for
more general relations. Applications include formalizing reduction-
based cryptographic proofs [3] and modeling stochastic dominance
and convergence of probabilistic processes [6]. Seeking to explain
the power of liftings, Barthe et al. [6] establish a tight connection
between probabilistic liftings and probabilistic couplings, a basic
tool in probability theory [24, 30]. Roughly, a probabilistic cou-
pling places two distributions in the same probabilistic space by
exhibiting a suitable witness distribution over pairs. Not only does
this observation open new uses for probabilistic liftings, it offers an
opportunity to revisit existing applications from a fresh perspective.
Differential privacy via approximate probabilistic liftings
Relational program logics [2, 4] and relational refinement type sys-
tems [8] are currently the most flexible techniques for reasoning
formally about differentially private computations. Their expressive
power stems from approximate probabilistic liftings, a generaliza-
tion of probabilistic liftings involving a metric on distributions. In
particular, differential privacy is a consequence of a particular form
of approximate lifting.
These approaches have successfully verified differential privacy
for many algorithms. However, they are unsuccessful when privacy
does not follow from standard tools and composition properties. In
fact, the present authors had long believed that the verification of
such examples was beyond the capabilities of lifting-based methods.
Contributions
In this paper, we propose the first formal analysis of differentially
private algorithms whose proof does not exclusively rely on the basic
tools of differential privacy. We make three broad contributions.
New proof principles for approximate liftings We take inspira-
tion from the connection between liftings and coupling to develop
new proof principles for approximate liftings.
First, we introduce a principle for decomposing proofs of differ-
ential privacy pointwise, supporting a common pattern of proving
privacy separately for each possible output value. This principle is
used in pen-and-paper proofs, but is new to formal approaches.
Second, we provide new proof principles for the Laplace mech-
anism. Informally speaking, existing proof principles capture the
intuition that different inputs can be made to look equal by the
Laplace mechanism in exchange for paying some privacy cost. Our
first new proof principle for the Laplace mechanism is dual, and
captures the idea that equal inputs can be made to look arbitrarily dif-
ferent by the Laplace mechanism, provided that one pays sufficient
privacy. Our second new proof principle for the Laplace mechanism
states that if we add the same noise in two runs of the Laplace mech-
anism, the distance between the two values is preserved and there is
no privacy cost. As far as we know, these proof principles are new
to the differential privacy literature. They are the key ingredients to
proving examples such as Sparse Vector using compositional proof
methods.
We also propose approximate probabilistic liftings for the one-
sided Laplace mechanism, which can be used to implement the
Exponential mechanism. The one-sided Laplace mechanism nicely
illustrates the benefits of our approach: although it is not differen-
tially private, its properties can be formally captured by approximate
probabilistic liftings. These properties can be combined to show pri-
vacy for a larger program.
An extended probabilistic relational program logic To demon-
strate our techniques, we work with the relational program logic
apRHL [4]. Conceived as a probabilistic variant of Benton’s rela-
tional Hoare logic [9], apRHL has been used to verify differential
privacy for examples using the standard composition theorems. Most
importantly, the semantics of apRHL uses approximate liftings. We
introduce new proof rules representing our new proof principles,
and call the resulting logic apRHL+.
New privacy proofs While the extensions amount to just a handful
of rules, they significantly increase the power of apRHL: We provide
the first formal verification of two algorithms whose privacy proofs
use tools beyond the composition theorems.
• The Exponential mechanism. The standard private algorithm
when the output is non-numeric, this construction is typically
taken as a primitive in systems verifying privacy. In contrast, we
prove its privacy within our logic.
• The Sparse Vector algorithm. Perhaps the most famous example
not covered by existing techniques, the proof of this mechanism
is quite involved; some of its variants are not provably private.
We also prove the privacy of its core subroutine in our logic.
The proofs are based on coupling ideas, which avoid reasoning about
probabilities explicitly. As a consequence, proofs are clean, concise,
and, we believe, appealing to researchers from both the differential
privacy and the formal verification communities.
We have formalized the proofs of these algorithms in an experi-
mental branch of the EasyCrypt proof assistant supporting approxi-
mate probabilistic liftings.
2. Differential privacy
In this section, we review the basic tools of differential privacy, and
we present the algorithm Above Threshold, which forms the main
subroutine of the Sparse Vector algorithm.
2.1 Basics
The basic definition of differential privacy is due to Dwork et al.
[14].
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A probabilistic computation
M : A → Distr(B) satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy w.r.t. an
adjacency relation Φ ⊆ A×A if for every pair of inputs a, a′ ∈ A
such that a Φ a′ and every subset of outputs E ⊆ B, we have
Pr
y←Ma
[y ∈ E] ≤ exp(ε) Pr
y←Ma′
[y ∈ E] + δ.
When δ = 0, we say that M is ε-differentially private.
Intuitively, the probabilistic condition ensures that any two inputs
satisfying the adjacency relation Φ result in similar distributions
over outputs. The relation Φ models which pairs of databases should
be protected, i.e., what data should be nearly indistinguishable.
While it may not be obvious from the definition, differential privacy
has a number of features that allow simple construction of private
algorithms with straightforward proofs of privacy. Specifically, the
vast majority of differential privacy proofs use two basic tools:
private primitives and composition theorems.
Private primitives These components form the building blocks of
private algorithms. The most basic example is the Laplace mech-
anism, which achieves differential privacy for numerical computa-
tions by adding probabilistic noise to the output. We will work with
the discrete version of this mechanism throughout the paper.
Definition 2 (Laplace mechanism [14]). Let ε > 0. The (discrete)
Laplace mechanism Lε : Z → SDistr(Z) is defined by Lε(t) =
t + ν, where ν ∈ Z is drawn from the Laplace distribution
Laplace(1/ε), i.e. with probabilities proportional to
Pr[ν] ∝ exp (−ε · |ν|).
The level of privacy depends on the sensitivity of the query.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity). Let k ∈ N. A function F : A → Z is
k-sensitive with respect to Φ ⊆ A×A if |F (a1)−F (a2)| ≤ k for
every a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1 Φ a2.
The following theorem shows that k-sensitive functions can be
made differentially private through the Laplace mechanism [14].
Theorem 1. Assume that F : A→ Z is k-sensitive with respect to
Φ. Let M : A→ Distr(Z) be the probabilistic function that maps
i← 1; r ← |Q|+ 1;
T $← Lε/2(t);
while i < |Q| do
S $← Lε/4(evalQ(Q[i], d));
if (T ≤ S ∧ r = |Q|+ 1) then r ← i;
i← i+ 1;
return r
Figure 1. The Above Threshold algorithm
a to Lε(F (a)). Then M is k · ε-differentially private with respect
to Φ.
Another private primitive is the Exponential mechanism, which
is the tool of choice when the desired output is non-numeric. While
this mechanism is often taken as a primitive construct, we will see
in § 5 how to verify its privacy.
Composition theorems These tools prove the privacy of a combi-
nation of private components, significantly simplifying the privacy
analysis. The most commonly instance, by far, is the powerful se-
quential composition theorem.
Theorem 2 (Sequential composition [13]). Let M : D →
Distr(R) be an (ε, δ)-private computation, and let M ′ : D →
R → Distr(R′) be an (ε′, δ′)-private computation in the first
argument for any fixed value of the second argument. Then, the
function
d 7→ bind M(d) M ′(d)
is (ε+ ε′, δ + δ′)-private.
One specific form of composition is post-processing. Informally,
the post-processing theorem states that the output of a differentially
private computation can be transformed while remaining private,
so long as the transformation does not depend on the private
data directly; such a transformation can be thought of as (0, 0)-
differentially private.
2.2 Above Threshold
While most private algorithms can be analyzed using composition
theorems and proofs of private primitives, some algorithms require
more intricate proofs. To give an example, we consider the Above
Threshold algorithm, which is the core of the Sparse Vector tech-
nique.1 The Sparse Vector algorithm takes as input a database d,
a list of numerical queries Q, a threshold t, and a natural number
k, and privately selects the first k queries from Q whose output
on d are approximately above the threshold. The Above Threshold
algorithm corresponds to the case k = 1.
The code of the algorithm is given in Figure 1. In words, AboveT
computes a noisy version T of the threshold t, computes for every
query q in the list Q a noisy version S of q(d), and returns the index
of the first query q such that T ≤ S or a default value if there is
no such query. It is easy to see that (ε, 0)-differential privacy of
AboveT directly implies (k · ε, 0)-differential privacy of Sparse
Vector, since we can simply run AboveT k times in sequence and
apply the sequential composition theorem.
If we try applying the sequential composition theorem (with
the privacy of the Laplace mechanism) to AboveT we can show
(|Q| · ε, 0)-differential privacy when all queries in Q are 1-sensitive,
where |Q| denotes the length of the list Q. However, a sophisticated
analysis gives a more precise privacy guarantee.
1 As this algorithm was not formally proposed in a canonical work, there
exist different variants of the algorithm. Some variants take as input a stream
rather than a list of queries, and/or output the result of a noisy query, rather
than its index; see the final remark in § 6 for further discussion.
Theorem 3 (see, e.g., Dwork and Roth [12]). Assuming all queries
in Q are 1-sensitive, AboveT is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
In other words, AboveT is provably ε-differentially private,
independent of the number of queries. This is a remarkable feature
of the Above Threshold algorithm.
3. Generalized probabilistic liftings
To verify advanced algorithms like AboveT, we will leverage
the power of approximate probabilistic liftings. In a nuthsell, our
proofs will replace the sequential composition theorem of differen-
tial privacy—which we’ve seen is not enough to verify our target
examples—with the more general composition principle of liftings.
This section reviews existing notions of (approximate) probabilis-
tic liftings and introduces proof principles for establishing their
existence. Most of these proof principles are new, including those
for equality (Proposition 2), differential privacy (Proposition 6),
the Laplace mechanism (Propositions 8 and 9), and the one-sided
Laplace mechanism (Propositions 10 and 11).
To avoid measure-theoretic issues, we base our technical de-
velopment on sub-distributions over discrete sets (discrete sub-
distributions). For simplicity, we will work with distributions over
the integers when considering distributions over numeric values.
We start by reviewing the standard definition of sub-distributions.
Let B be a countable set. A function µ : B → R≥0 is
• a sub-distribution over B if
∑
b∈supp(µ) µ(b) ≤ 1; and
• a distribution over B if
∑
b∈supp(µ) µ(b) = 1.
As usual, the support supp(µ) is the subset of B with non-zero
weight under µ. Let Distr(B) and SDistr(B) denote the sets
of discrete sub-distributions and distributions respectively over
B. Equality of distributions is defined as pointwise equality of
functions.
Probabilistic liftings and couplings are defined in terms of a
distribution over products, and its marginal distributions. Formally,
the first and second marginals of a sub-distribution µ ∈ Distr(B1×
B2) are simply the projections: the sub-distributions π1(µ) ∈
Distr(B1) and π2(µ) ∈ Distr(B2) given by
π1(µ)(b1) =
∑
b2∈B2
µ(b1, b2) π2(µ)(b2) =
∑
b1∈B1
µ(b1, b2).
3.1 Probabilistic couplings and liftings
Probabilistic couplings and liftings are standard tools in probability
theory, and semantics and verification, respectively. We present their
definitions to highlight their similarities before discussing some
useful consequences.
Definition 4 (Coupling). There is a coupling between two sub-
distributions µ1 ∈ Distr(B1) and µ2 ∈ Distr(B2) if there exists
a sub-distribution (called the witness) µ ∈ Distr(B1 × B2) s.t.
π1(µ) = µ1 and π2(µ) = µ2.
Probabilistic liftings are a special class of couplings.
Definition 5 (Lifting). Two sub-distributions µ1 ∈ Distr(B1)
and µ2 ∈ Distr(B2) are related by the (probabilistic) lifting
of Ψ ⊆ B1 × B2, written µ1Ψ]µ2, if there exists a coupling
µ ∈ Distr(B1 ×B2) of µ1 and µ2 such that supp(µ) ⊆ Ψ.
Probabilistic liftings have many useful consequences. For exam-
ple, µ1 =] µ2 holds exactly when the sub-distributions µ1 and µ2
are equal. Less trivially, liftings can bound the probability of one
event by the probability of another event. This observation is useful
for formalizing reduction-based cryptographic proofs.
Proposition 1 (Barthe et al. [3]). Let E1 ⊆ B1, E2 ⊆ B2,
µ1 ∈ Distr(B1) and µ2 ∈ Distr(B2). Define
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ B1 ×B2 | x1 ∈ E1 ⇒ x2 ∈ E2}.
If µ1Ψ]µ2, then
Pr
x1←µ1
[x1 ∈ E1] ≤ Pr
x2←µ2
[x2 ∈ E2].
One key observation for our approach is that this result can also
be used to prove equality between distributions in a pointwise style.
Proposition 2 (Equality by pointwise lifting).
• Let µ1, µ2 ∈ SDistr(B). For every b ∈ B, define
Ψb = {(x1, x2) ∈ B ×B | x1 = b⇒ x2 = b}.
If µ1 Ψ]b µ2 for all b ∈ B, then µ1 = µ2.
• Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(B). For every b ∈ B, define
Ψb = {(x1, x2) ∈ B ×B | x1 = b⇔ x2 = b}.
If µ1 Ψ]b µ2 for all b ∈ B, then µ1 = µ2.
Proof. We prove the first item; the second item follows similarly.
First, a simple observation: two distributions µ1 and µ2 are
equal iff µ1(b) ≤ µ2(b) for every b ∈ B. Indeed, suppose that
µ1(b̄) 6= µ2(b̄) for some b̄ ∈ B. Then, µ1(b̄) < µ2(b̄), so∑
b∈B
µ1(b) <
∑
b∈B
µ2(b),
contradicting the fact that µ1 and µ2 are distributions:∑
b∈B
µ1(b) =
∑
b∈B
µ2(b) = 1.
Thus, in order to show µ1 = µ2, it is sufficient to prove
Prx←µ1 [x = b] ≤ Prx←µ2 [x = b] for every b ∈ B. These in-
equalities follow from Proposition 1.
3.2 Approximate liftings
It has previously been shown that differential privacy follows from
an approximate version of liftings [4]. Our presentation follows
subsequent refinements by Barthe and Olmedo [2]. We start by
defining a notion of distance between sub-distributions.
Definition 6 (Barthe et al. [4]). Let ε ≥ 0. The ε-DP divergence
∆ε(µ1, µ2) between two sub-distributions µ1 ∈ Distr(B) and
µ2 ∈ Distr(B) is defined as
sup
E⊆B
(
Pr
x←µ1
[x ∈ E]− exp(ε) Pr
x←µ2
[x ∈ E]
)
The following proposition relates ε-DP divergence with (ε, δ)-
differential privacy.
Proposition 3 (Barthe et al. [4]). A probabilistic computation
M : A → Distr(B) is (ε, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. an
adjacency relation Φ iff
∆ε(M(a),M(a
′)) ≤ δ
for every two adjacent inputs a and a′ (i.e. such that a Φ a′).
We can use DP-divergence to define an approximate version of
probabilistic lifting, called (ε, δ)-lifting. We adopt the definition
by Barthe and Olmedo [2], which extends to a general class of
distances called f -divergences.
Definition 7 ((ε, δ)-lifting). Two sub-distributions µ1 ∈ Distr(B1)
and µ2 ∈ Distr(B2) are related by the (ε, δ)-lifting of Ψ ⊆
B1 × B2, written µ1Ψ](ε,δ)µ2, if there exist two witness sub-
distributions µL ∈ Distr(B1 ×B2) and µR ∈ Distr(B1 ×B2)
such that
1. π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR) = µ2;
2. supp(µL) ⊆ Ψ and supp(µR) ⊆ Ψ; and
3. ∆ε(µL, µR) ≤ δ.
It is relatively easy to see that two sub-distributions µ1 and µ2
are related by =](ε,δ) iff ∆ε(µ1, µ2) ≤ δ. Therefore, a probabilistic
computation M : A → Distr(B) is (ε, δ)-differentially private
w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ iff
M(a) =](ε,δ) M(a′)
for every two adjacent inputs a and a′ (i.e. such that a Φ a′).
This fact forms the basis of previous lifting-based approaches for
differential privacy [2, 4, 5, 8].
A useful preliminary fact is that approximate liftings generalize
probabilistic liftings (which we will sometimes call exact liftings).
Proposition 4. Suppose we are given distributions µ1 ∈ SDistr(B1)
and µ2 ∈ SDistr(B2) and a relation Ψ ⊆ B1 × B2. Then,
µ1Ψ
]µ2 if and only if µ1Ψ](0,0)µ2.
Proof. The forward direction is easy: simply define µL = µR to be
the witness of the exact lift. The reverse direction follows from
the observations that the witnesses µL and µR are necessarily
distributions, and that ∆0 is the total variation distance (a.k.a.
statistical distance) on distributions, in particular ∆0(µL, µR) = 0
iff µL = µR. To see this last point, ∆0(µL, µR) = 0 entails
µL(b1, b2) ≤ µR(b1, b2)
for every (b1, b2) ∈ B1 ×B2. So µL = µR by Proposition 2.
The previous results for exact liftings generalize smoothly to
approximate liftings. First, we can generalize Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 (Barthe and Olmedo [2]). Let E1 ⊆ B1, E2 ⊆ B2,
µ1 ∈ Distr(B1) and µ2 ∈ Distr(B2). Let
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ B1 ×B2 | x1 ∈ E1 ⇒ x2 ∈ E2}.
If µ1Ψ](ε,δ)µ2, then
Pr
x1←µ1
[x1 ∈ E1] ≤ exp(ε) Pr
x2←µ2
[x2 ∈ E2] + δ.
We can use this proposition to generalize Proposition 2, which
provides a way to prove that two distributions µ1 and µ2 are equal—
equivalently, µ1 =] µ2. Generalizing this lifting from exact to
approximate yields the following pointwise characterization of
differential privacy, a staple technique of pen-and-paper proofs.
Proposition 6 (Differential privacy from pointwise lifting). A prob-
abilistic computation M : A → Distr(B) is (ε, δ)-differentially
private w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ iff there exists (δb)b∈B ∈ R≥0
such that
∑
b∈B δb ≤ δ, andM(a) Ψ
](ε,δb)
b M(a
′) for every b ∈ B
and every two adjacent inputs a and a′, where
Ψb = {(x1, x2) ∈ B ×B | x1 = b⇒ x2 = b}.
Proof. First note that ∆ε(µ1, µ2) ≤ δ iff there exists (δb)b∈B ∈
R≥0 s.t. µ1(b) ≤ exp(ε)µ2(b) + δb for every b ∈ B, and∑
b∈B δb ≤ δ. So, it is sufficient to show that for every b ∈ B
and every two adjacent inputs a and a′, we have
Pr
x←M(a)
[x = b] ≤ exp(ε) Pr
x←M(a′)
[x = b] + δb
with
∑
b∈B δb ≤ δ. This follows from Proposition 5.
3.3 Probabilistic liftings for the Laplace mechanism
So far, we have seen general properties about approximate liftings
and differential privacy. Now, we turn to more specific liftings
relevant to typical distributions in differential privacy. In terms
of approximate liftings, we can state the privacy of the Laplace
mechanism (Theorem 1)in the following form.
Proposition 7. Let v1, v2 ∈ Z and k ∈ N s.t. |v1 − v2| ≤ k. Then
Lε(v1) =](k·ε,0) Lε(v2).
Proposition 7 is sufficiently general to capture most examples
from the literature, but not for the examples of this paper; informally,
applying Proposition 7 only allows us to prove privacy using the
standard composition theorems. To see how we might generalize the
principle, note that privacy from pointwise liftings (Proposition 6)
involves liftings of an asymmetric relation, rather than equality. This
suggests that it could be profitable to consider asymmetric liftings.
Indeed, we propose the following generalization of Proposition 7.
Proposition 8. Let v1, v2, k ∈ Z. Then
Lε(v1) Ψ](|k+v1−v2|·ε,0) Lε(v2),
where
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 + k = x2}.
Proof. It suffices to prove µ1 Ψ](|k+v1−v2|·ε,0) µ2, where µ1 is the
distribution of v1 +η1 +k and µ2 is the distribution of v2 +η2, with
η1, η2 draws from the discrete Laplace distribution Laplace(1/ε).
By the definition of the Laplace mechanism, µ1 = Lε(v1 + k) and
µ2 = Lε(v2). Now, we can conclude by Proposition 7.
Proposition 8 has several useful consequences. For instance,
when |v1 − v2| ≤ k we have Lε(v1) Ψ](2k·ε,0) Lε(v2) with
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 + k = x2}, (1)
following from Proposition 8 and the triangle inequality
|v1 − v2| ≤ k ⇒ |k + (v1 − v2)| ≤ k + k = 2k.
Informally, this instance of Proposition 8 shows that by “paying”
privacy cost ε, we can ensure that the samples are a certain distance
apart. This stands in contrast to Proposition 7, which ensures that
the samples are equal.
Another useful consequence is that adding identical noise to both
v1 and v2 incurs no privacy cost, and we can assume the difference
between the samples is the difference between v1 and v2.
Proposition 9. Let v1, v2 ∈ Z. ThenLε(v1) Ψ](0,0) Lε(v2), where
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 − x2 = v1 − v2}.
Proof. Immediate by Proposition 8 with k = v2 − v1.
3.4 Probabilistic liftings for one-sided Laplace mechanism
While the Laplace mechanism is already sufficient to implement
a wide variety of private algorithms, a few algorithms use other
distributions. In particular, the Exponential mechanism can be
implemented in terms of the one-sided Laplace mechanism. This
algorithm is the same as the Laplace mechanism except noise is
drawn from the one-sided Laplace distribution (also called the
exponential distribution), which outputs non-negative integers.
Definition 8 (One-sided Laplace mechanism). Let ε > 0. The
discrete one-sided Laplace mechanism Losε : Z → SDistr(Z) is
defined by
Losε (t) = t+ ν,
where ν non-negative integer drawn from the Laplace distribution
Laplace+(1/ε), i.e. with probabilities proportional to
Pr[ν] ∝ exp (−ε · ν).
While this mechanism is not ε-differentially private for any ε, we
can still consider probabilistic liftings for the samples. We have the
following two results, analogous to Propositions 8 and 9.
Proposition 10. Let v1, v2, k ∈ Z such that k ≥ v2 − v1. Then
Losε (v1) Ψ]((k+v1−v2)·ε,0) Losε (v2),
where
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 + k = x2}.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case where v1 = v2 = 0: Losε (v)
is the same distribution as sampling from Losε (0) and adding v, so
the desired conclusion follows from
Losε (0) Ψ′]((k+v1−v2)·ε,0) Losε (0),
where
Ψ′ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | (x1 + v1) + k = (x2 + v2)}
= {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 + (k + v1 − v2) = x2},
which follows from the v1 = v2 = 0 case since k + v1 − v2 ≥ 0
by assumption.
So, we assume v1 = v2 = 0 and k ≥ 0. We will directly define
the two witnesses of the approximate lifting. Let
G(v) = Pr
x←Losε (0)
[x = v].
Define the left witness µL on its support by
µL(i− k, i) = G(i)
for i ≥ k, and the right witness µR on its support by
µR(j, j + k) = G(j)
for j ≥ −k. Evidently the marginals are correct—π1(µL) =
π2(µR) = Losε (0)—so it remains to check that ∆kε(µL, µR) ≤ 0:
max
E⊆Z×Z
(
Pr
x←µL
[x ∈ E]− exp(kε) Pr
x←µR
[x ∈ E]
)
≤ 0.
It suffices to prove this pointwise over the union of the supports of
µL and µR: for each j ≥ −k, we need
Pr
x←µL
[x = (j, j + k)]− exp(kε) Pr
x←µR
[x = (j, j + k)] ≤ 0.
This is evident for j < 0, when the first term is zero and the second
term is non-negative. For j ≥ 0 we need to show
G(j)− exp(kε)G(j + k) ≤ 0,
which follows by direct calculation (or, the privacy of the standard
Laplace distribution).
Proposition 11. Let v1, v2 ∈ Z. Then Losε (v1) Ψ](0,0) Losε (v2),
where
Ψ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 − x2 = v1 − v2}.
Proof. It suffices to prove
Losε (v1) Ψ′](0,0) Losε (v2),
where
Ψ′ = {(x1, x2) ∈ Z× Z | x1 − v1 = x2 − v2}.
This is equivalent to
Losε (v1 − v1) =](0,0) Losε (v2 − v2),
which is obvious by Proposition 4 since both sides are the same
distribution.
` x1 ← e1 ∼〈0,0〉 x2 ← e2 : Ψ {e1〈1〉, e2〈2〉/x1〈1〉, x2〈2〉} =⇒ Ψ[ASSN]
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ ∧ b1〈1〉 =⇒ Ψ ` d1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 d2 : Φ ∧ ¬b1〈1〉 =⇒ Ψ
` if b1 then c1 else d1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 if b2 then c2 else d2 : Φ ∧ b1〈1〉 = b2〈2〉 =⇒ Ψ
[COND]
` c1 ∼〈εk,δk〉 c2 : Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 ∧ b2〈2〉 ∧ k = e〈1〉 ∧ e〈1〉 ≤ n =⇒ Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 = b2〈2〉 ∧ k < e〈1〉 Θ ∧ e〈1〉 ≤ 0⇒ ¬b1〈1〉
` while b1 do c1 ∼〈∑nk=1 εk,∑nk=1 δk〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 = b2〈2〉 ∧ e〈1〉 ≤ n =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1〈1〉 ∧ ¬b2〈2〉
[WHILE]
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ′ ` c′1 ∼〈ε′,δ′〉 c′2 : Ψ′ =⇒ Ψ
` c1; c′1 ∼〈ε+ε′,δ+δ′〉 c2; c′2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ
[SEQ]
` c1 ∼〈ε′,δ′〉 c2 : Φ′ =⇒ Ψ′ Φ⇒ Φ′ Ψ′ ⇒ Ψ ε′ ≤ ε δ′ ≤ δ
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ
[CONSEQ]
Figure 2. Proof rules from apRHL
4. Formalization in a program logic
In this section we present a new program logic called apRHL+ for
reasoning about differential privacy of programs written in a core
programming language with samplings from the Laplace mechanism
and the one-sided Laplace Mechanism. Our program logic apRHL+
extends apRHL, a relational Hoare logic that has been used to verify
many examples of differentially private algorithms [4]. The main
result of this section is a proof of soundness of the logic (Theorem 4).
Programs We consider a simple imperative language with random
sampling. The set of commands is defined inductively:
C ::= skip noop
| C; C sequencing
| X ← E deterministic assignment
| X $← Lε(E) Laplace mechanism
| X $← Losε (E) one-sided Laplace mechanism
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
where X is a set of variables and E is a set of expressions. Vari-
ables and expressions are typed, and range over boolean, integers,
databases, queries, and lists.
The semantics of programs is standard [4, 22]. We first define
the set Mem of memories to contain all well-typed functions from
variables to values. Expressions and distribution expressions map
memories to values and distributions over values, respectively: an
expression e of type T is interpreted as a function [[e]] : Mem→ T ,
whereas a distribution expression g is interpreted as a function
[[g]] : Mem → SDistr(Z). Finally, commands are interpreted as
functions from memories to sub-distributions over memories, i.e.
the interpretation of c is a function [[c]] : Mem→ Distr(Mem). We
refer to Barthe et al. [4], Kozen [22] for an account of the semantics.
Assertions and judgments Assertions in the logic are first-order
formulae over generalized expressions. The latter are expressions
built from tagged variables x〈1〉 and x〈2〉, where the tag is used to
determine whether the interpretation of the variable is taken in the
first memory or in the second memory. For instance, x〈1〉 = x〈2〉+1
is the assertion which states that the interpretation of the variable x
in the first memory is equal to the interpretation of the variable x in
the second memory plus 1. More formally, assertions are interpreted
as predicates over pairs of memories. We let [[Φ]] denote the set of
memories (m1,m2) that satisfy Φ. The interpretation is standard
(besides the use of tagged variables) and is omitted. By abuse of
notation, we write e〈1〉 or e〈2〉, where e is a program expression, to
denote the generalized expression built according to e, but in which
all variables are tagged with a 〈1〉 or 〈2〉, respectively.
Judgments in both apRHL and apRHL+ are of the form
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ
where c1 and c2 are statements, the precondition Φ and postcon-
dition Ψ are relational assertions, and ε and δ are non-negative
reals.2 Informally, a judgment of the above form is valid if the two
distributions produced by the executions of c1 and c2 on any two
initial memories satisfying the precondition Φ are related by the
(ε, δ)-lifting of the postcondition Ψ. Formally, the judgment
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ
is valid iff for every two memories m1 and m2, such that
m1 [[Φ]] m2, we have
([[c1]]m1) [[Ψ]]
](ε,δ) ([[c2]]m2).
Proof system Figure 2 presents the main rules from apRHL
excluding the sampling rule, which we generalize in apRHL+. We
briefly comment on some of these rules.
The rule [SEQ] for sequential composition generalizes the se-
quential composition theorem of differential privacy, which intu-
itively corresponds to the case where the postcondition of the com-
posed commands is equality. This generalization allows apRHL to
prove differential privacy using the coupling composition principle
when the standard composition theorem is insufficient.
The rule [WHILE] for while loops can be seen as a generalization
of a k-fold composition theorem for differential privacy. Again, it
allows to consider arbitrary postconditions, whereas the composition
theorem would correspond to the case where the postcondition of
the loop is equality (in conjunction with negation of the guards). We
often use two simpler instances of the rule. The first one corresponds
to the case where the values of εk and δk are independent of k, i.e.
εk = ε and δk = δ, yielding a bound of 〈n · ε, n · δ〉. The second
one corresponds to the case where a single iteration carries a privacy
cost, as shown in the rule [WHILEEXT] in Figure 4. This weaker rule
is in fact sufficient for proving privacy of several of our examples,
including the Above Threshold algorithm (but not the Sparse Vector
algorithm, which also uses the aforementioned instance of the while
rule), the Exponential mechanism, and Report-noisy-max.
2 The original apRHL rules are based on a multiplicative privacy budget. We
adapt the rules to an additive privacy parameter for consistency with the rest
of the article and the broader privacy literature.
∀i. ` c1 ∼〈ε,δi〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ x〈1〉 = i⇒ x〈2〉 = i
∑
i∈I δi ≤ δ
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ =⇒ x〈1〉 = x〈2〉
[FORALL-EQ]
` y1 $← Lε(e1) ∼〈k′·ε,0〉 y2 $← Lε(e2) : |k + e1〈1〉 − e2〈2〉| ≤ k′ =⇒ y1〈1〉+ k = y2〈2〉
[LAPGEN]
y1 /∈ FV (e1) y2 /∈ FV (e2)
` y1 $← Lε(e1) ∼〈0,0〉 y2 $← Lε(e2) : > =⇒ y1〈1〉 − y2〈2〉 = e1〈1〉 − e2〈2〉
[LAPNULL]
` y1 $← Losε (e1) ∼〈k′·ε,0〉 y2 $← Losε (e2) : 0 ≤ k + e1〈1〉 − e2〈2〉 ≤ k′ =⇒ y1〈1〉+ k = y2〈2〉
[ONELAPGEN]
y1 /∈ FV (e1) y2 /∈ FV (e2)
` y1 $← Losε (e1) ∼〈0,0〉 y2 $← Losε (e2) : > =⇒ y1〈1〉 − y2〈2〉 = e1〈1〉 − e2〈2〉
[ONELAPNULL]
` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c : Φ ∧ b1〈1〉 =⇒ Ψ ` d1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c : Φ ∧ ¬b1〈1〉 =⇒ Ψ
` if b1 then c1 else d1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c : Φ =⇒ Ψ
[COND-L]
` c ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ ∧ b2〈2〉 =⇒ Ψ ` c ∼〈ε,δ〉 d2 : Φ ∧ ¬b2〈2〉 =⇒ Ψ
` c ∼〈ε,δ〉 if b2 then c2 else d2 : Φ =⇒ Ψ
[COND-R]
Figure 3. Proof rules from apRHL+
Figure 3 collects the new rules in apRHL+, which are all derived
from the new proof principles we saw in the previous section.
The first rule [FORALL-EQ] allows proving differential privacy
via pointwise privacy; this rule reflects Proposition 6.
The next pair of rules, [LAPGEN] and [LAPNULL], reflect the
liftings of the distributions of the Laplace mechanism presented in
Propositions 8 and 9 respectively. Note that we need a side-condition
on the free variables in [LAPNULL]—otherwise, the sample may
change e1 and e2.The following pair of rules, [ONELAPGEN] and
[ONELAPNULL], give similar liftings for the one-sided Laplace
mechanism following Propositions 10 and 11 respectively.
Finally, the last pair of rules allows reasoning about a conditional
while treating the other command abstractly. These so-called one-
sided rules were already present in the logic pRHL, a predecessor
of apRHL based on exact liftings [3], but they were never needed
in apRHL. In apRHL+ the one-sided rules are quite useful, in
conjunction with our richer sampling rules, for reasoning about two
conditionals that may take different branches.
Soundness The soundness of the new rules immediately follows
from the results of the previous section, while soundness for the
apRHL rules was established previously [4].
Theorem 4. All judgments derivable in apRHL+ are valid.
5. Exponential mechanism
In this section, we provide a formal proof of the Exponential
mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [27]. While there is existing
work that proves differential privacy of this mechanism [4], the
proofs operate on the raw denotational semantics. In contrast, we
work entirely within our program logic.
The Exponential mechanism is designed to privately compute
the best response from a set R of possible response, according
to some integer-valued quality score function qscore that takes
as input an element in R and a database d. Given a database d
and a k-sensitive quality score function qscore, the Exponential
mechanism ExpM(d, qscore) outputs an element r of the rangeR
with probability proportional to
Pr[r] ∝ exp
(
ε · qscore(r, d)
2k
)
.
The shape of the distribution ensures that the Exponential mecha-
nism favors elements with higher quality scores.
The seminal result of McSherry and Talwar [27] establishes
differential privacy for this mechanism.
Theorem 5. Assume that the quality score is 1-sensitive, i.e. for
every output r and adjacent databases d, d′,
|qscore(r, d)− qscore(r, d′)| ≤ 1.
Then the probabilistic computation that maps d to ExpM(d, qscore)
is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
While there does not seem to be much of a program to verify,
it is known that the Exponential mechanism can be implemented
more explicitly in terms of the one-sided Laplace mechanism [12].
Informally, the code loops through all the possible output values,
adding one-sided Laplace noise to the quality score for the val-
ue/database pair. Throughout the computation, the code tracks the
current highest noisy score and the corresponding element. Finally,
it returns the top element. For the sake of simplicity we assume
thatR = {1, . . . , R} for some R ∈ N; generalizing to an arbitrary
finite set poses little difficulty for the verification. Figure 5 shows
the code of the implementation.
Informal proof The privacy proof for the Exponential mecha-
nism cannot follow from the composition theorems of differential
privacy—the one-sided Laplace noise does not satisfy differential
privacy, so there is nothing to compose. Nonetheless, we can still
show (ε, 0)-differential privacy using our lifting-based techniques.
By Proposition 6, it suffices to show that for every integer i and
quality score qscore, the output of ExpM on two adjacent databases
yields sub-distributions on memories that are related by the (ε, 0)-
lifting of the interpretation of the assertion
max 〈1〉 = i⇒ max 〈2〉 = i.
We outline a coupling argument. First, we consider iterations of the
loop body in which the loop counter r satisfies r < i. In this case,
` c1 ∼〈0,0〉 c2 : Φ ∧ i < e〈1〉 =⇒ Ψ ` c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 c2 : Φ ∧ e〈1〉 = i =⇒ Ψ ` c1 ∼〈0,0〉 c2 : Φ ∧ e〈1〉 < i =⇒ Ψ
Θ ∧ e〈1〉 ≤ 0⇒ ¬b1〈1〉 Φ , Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 ∧ b2〈2〉 ∧ k = e〈1〉 Ψ , Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 = b2〈2〉 ∧ k < e〈1〉
` while b1 do c1 ∼〈ε,δ〉 while b2 do c2 : Θ ∧ b1〈1〉 = b2〈2〉 ∧ e〈1〉 ≤ n =⇒ Θ ∧ ¬b1〈1〉 ∧ ¬b2〈2〉
[WHILEEXT]
(Note that the two premises for i < e〈1〉 and i > e〈1〉 can be combined. However, we often use different reasoning for these cases, so we
prefer to present the rule with 3 premises.)
Figure 4. Specialized proof rule for while loops
r ← 1; bq ← 0;
while r ≤ R do
cq $← Losε/2(qscore(d, r));
if (cq > bq ∨ r = 1) thenmax ← r; bq ← cq;
r ← r + 1;
returnmax
Figure 5. Implementation of the Exponential mechanism
we couple the two samplings using the rule [ONELAPNULL], using
adjacency of the two databases and 1-sensitivity of the quality score
function to establish the (0, 0)-lifting:
max 〈1〉 < i ∧ max 〈2〉 < i ∧ |bq〈1〉 − bq〈2〉| ≤ 1.
The interesting case is r = i. In this case, we use the rule
[ONELAPGEN] to couple the random samplings so that
cq〈1〉+ 1 = cq〈2〉.
This coupling has privacy cost (ε, 0) and ensures that the following
(ε, 0)-lifting holds at the end of the ith iteration:
(max 〈1〉 = max 〈2〉 = i ∧ bq〈1〉+ 1 = bq〈2〉) ∨max 〈1〉 6= i
Using the rule [ONELAPNULL] repeatedly, we couple the random
samplings from the remaining iterations to prove that the above
(ε, 0)-lifting remains valid through subsequent iterations—note that
couplings for iterations beyond i incur no privacy cost. Finally, we
apply the rule of consequence to conclude the desired (ε, 0)-lifting:
max 〈1〉 = i⇒ max 〈2〉 = i
Formal proof We prove the following apRHL+ judgment, which
entails (ε, 0)-differential privacy:
` ExpM ∼〈ε,0〉 ExpM : Φ =⇒ max 〈1〉 = max 〈2〉
where Φ denotes the precondition
adj(d〈1〉, d〈2〉)
∧ qscore〈1〉 = qscore〈2〉
∧ ∀r ∈ R. |qscore〈1〉(d〈1〉, r)− qscore〈1〉(d〈2〉, r)| ≤ 1.
The conjuncts of the precondition are self-explanatory: the first
states that the two databases are adjacent, the second states that the
two score functions are equal, and the last states that the quality
score function is 1-sensitive.
By the rule [FORALL-EQ], it suffices to prove
` ExpM ∼〈ε,0〉 ExpM : Φ =⇒ (max 〈1〉 = i)⇒ (max 〈2〉 = i).
for every i ∈ Z. The main step is to apply the [WHILEEXT] rule
with a suitably chosen loop invariant Θ. We set Θ to be
(r〈1〉 < i⇒ Θ<) ∧ (r〈1〉 ≥ i⇒ Θ≥) ∧ r〈1〉 = r〈2〉,
where Θ< stands for
max 〈1〉 < i ∧ max 〈2〉 < i ∧ |bq〈1〉 − bq〈2〉| ≤ 1
and Θ≥ stands for
(max 〈1〉 = max 〈2〉 = i ∧ bq〈1〉+ 1 = bq〈2〉) ∨max 〈1〉 6= i.
Omitting the assertions required for proving termination and syn-
chronization of the loop iterations (which follows from the conjunct
r〈1〉 = r〈2〉), we have to prove three different judgments:
• case r < i: ` c ∼〈0,0〉 c : r〈1〉 < i ∧Θ< =⇒ Θ<
• case r = i: ` c ∼〈ε,0〉 c : r〈1〉 = i ∧Θ< =⇒ Θ≥
• case r > i: ` c ∼〈0,0〉 c : r〈1〉 > i ∧Θ≥ =⇒ Θ≥
where c denotes the loop body of ExpM:
cq $← Losε/2(qscore(d, r));
if (cq > bq ∨ r = 1) thenmax ← r; bq ← cq;
r ← r + 1
Corresponding conditional statements may take the different
branches, so we apply one sided-rules [COND-L] and [COND-R].
Report-noisy-max A closely-related mechanism is Report-noisy-
max (see, e.g., Dwork and Roth [12]). This algorithm has the exact
same code except that it samples from the standard (two-sided)
Laplace distribution rather than the one-sided Laplace distribution.
It is straightforward to prove privacy for this modification with
the axiom [LAPGEN] (resp. [LAPNULL]) for the standard Laplace
distribution in place of [ONELAPGEN] (resp. [ONELAPNULL]).
6. Above Threshold algorithm
The Sparse Vector algorithm is the canonical example of a program
whose privacy proof goes beyond proofs of privacy primitives
and composition theorem. The core of the algorithm is the Above
Threshold algorithm. In this section, we prove that the latter (as
modeled by the program AboveT) is (ε, 0)-differentially private;
privacy for the full mechanism follows by sequential composition.
Informal proof By Proposition 6, it suffices to show that for every
integer i, the output of AboveT on two adjacent databases yields
two sub-distributions over Mem that are related by the (ε, 0)-lifting
of the interpretation of the assertion
r〈1〉 = i⇒ r〈2〉 = i.
The coupling proof goes as follows. We start by coupling the
samplings of the noisy thresholds so that T 〈1〉+ 1 = T 〈2〉; the cost
of this coupling is (ε/2, 0). For the first i − 1 queries, we couple
the samplings of the noisy query outputs using the rule [LAPNULL].
By 1-sensitivity of the queries and adjacency of the two databases,
we know evalQ(Q[j], d)〈2〉 − evalQ(Q[j], d)〈1〉 ≤ 1, so
S〈1〉 < T 〈1〉 ⇒ S〈2〉 < T 〈2〉.
Thus, if side 〈1〉 does not change the value of r, neither does side
〈2〉. In fact, we have the stronger invariant
r〈1〉 = |Q|+ 1⇒ r〈2〉 = |Q|+ 1∧ (r〈1〉 = |Q|+ 1∨ r〈1〉 < i),
where r = |Q| + 1 means that the loop has not exceeded the
threshold yet.
When we reach the ith iteration and i < |Q|+ 1, we couple the
samplings of S so that S〈1〉+ 1 = S〈2〉; the cost of this coupling
is (ε/2, 0). Because T 〈1〉 + 1 = T 〈2〉 and S〈1〉 + 1 = S〈2〉, we
enter the conditional in the second execution as soon as we enter the
conditional in the first execution. For the remaining iterations r > i,
it is easy to prove
r〈1〉 = i⇒ r〈2〉 = i.
Formal proof We prove the following apRHL+ judgment, which
entails (ε, 0)-differential privacy:
` AboveT ∼〈ε,0〉 AboveT : Φ =⇒ r〈1〉 = r〈2〉,
where Φ denotes the precondition
adj(d〈1〉, d〈2〉)
∧ t〈1〉 = t〈2〉
∧ Q〈1〉 = Q〈2〉
∧ ∀j. |evalQ(Q〈1〉[j], d〈1〉)− evalQ(Q〈2〉[j], d〈2〉)| ≤ 1.
The conjuncts of the precondition are straightforward: the first states
that the two databases are adjacent, the second and third state that
Q and t coincide in both runs, and the last states that all queries are
1-sensitive. By the rule [FORALL-EQ], it suffices to prove
` AboveT ∼〈ε,0〉 AboveT : Φ =⇒ (r〈1〉 = i)⇒ (r〈2〉 = i).
for every i ∈ Z.
We begin with the three initializations:
j ← 1;
r ← |Q|+ 1;
T $← Lε(t);
This command c0 computes a noisy version of the threshold t. We
use the rule [LAPGEN] with ε = ε/2, k = 1 and k′ = k, noticing
that t is the same value in both sides. This proves the judgment
` c0 ∼ε/2 c0 : Φ =⇒ T 〈1〉+ 1 = T 〈2〉.
Notice that the ε/2 we are paying here is not for the privacy of
the threshold—which is not private information!—but rather for
ensuring that the noisy thresholds are one apart in the two runs.
Next, we consider the main loop c1:
while j < |Q| do
S $← Lε/4(evalQ(Q[j], d));
if (T ≤ S ∧ r = |Q|+ 1) then r ← j;
j ← j + 1;
and prove the judgment
` c1 ∼ε/2 c1 : Φ∧T 〈1〉+1 = T 〈2〉 =⇒ (r〈1〉 = i)⇒ (r〈2〉 = i)
with the [WHILEEXT] rule. The proof is similar to the one for the
Exponential mechanism, using invariants from the informal proof.
Other versions of Above Threshold As noted in the introduction,
different versions of Above Threshold have been considered in the
literature. One variant returns the first noisy value above threshold;
see Figure 6 for the code. While this was thought to be private,
errors in the proof were later uncovered. Under our coupling proof,
the error is obvious: we need to prove v〈1〉 = v〈2〉 for the result
to be private, so we need evalQ(Q[i], d〈1〉) = evalQ(Q[i], d〈2〉)
after the critical iteration r = i. But we have already coupled
evalQ(Q[i], d〈1〉) + 1 = evalQ(Q[i], d〈2〉) during this iteration.
Lyu et al. [25] provide further discussion of this, and other, incorrect
implementations of the Sparse Vector technique.
On the other hand, it is possible to prove (2ε, 0)-differential
privacy for a modified version of the algorithm, where the returned
value uses fresh noise (e.g. by adding after the loop has completed
the sampling v $← Lε(evalQ(Q[r], d))).
i← 1; v ← 0; r ← |Q|+ 1;
T $← Lε/2(t);
while i < |Q| do
S $← Lε/4(evalQ(Q[i], d));
if (T ≤ S ∧ r = |Q|+ 1) then r ← i; v ← S
i← i+ 1;
return v
Figure 6. Buggy Above Threshold algorithm
Another interesting variant of the algorithm deals with streams of
queries. If the output of the queries is uniformly bounded below, then
the program terminates with probability 1 and the proof proceeds as
usual. However, if the answers to the stream of queries are below
the threshold and falling, the probability of non-termination can be
positive. The interaction of non-termination and differential privacy
is unusual; most works assume that algorithms always terminate.
The Sparse Vector technique has also been studied by the
database community. Recent work by Chen and Machanavajjhala
[10] shows that many proposed generalizations of the Sparse Vector
algorithm are not differentially private.
7. Related work
Coupling is an established tool in probability theory, but it seems
less familiar to computer science. It was only quite recently that
couplings have been used in cryptography; according to Hoang
and Rogaway [20], who use couplings to reason about generalized
Feistel networks, Mironov [28] first used this technique in his
analysis of RC4. Similarly, we are not aware of couplings in
differential privacy, though there seems to be an implicit coupling
argument by Dwork et al. [16]. There are seemingly few applications
of coupling in formal verification, despite considerable research
on probabilistic bisimulation (first introduced by Larsen and Skou
[23]) and probabilistic relational program logics (first introduced
by Barthe et al. [3]). The connection between liftings and couplings
was recently noted by Barthe et al. [6].
There are many language-based techniques for proving differen-
tial privacy for programs, including dynamic checking [17, 26], the
already mentioned relational program logic [2, 4] and relational re-
finement type systems [8], linear (dependent) type systems [18, 29],
product programs [5], and methods based on computing bisimu-
lations families for probabilistic automata [31, 32]. None of these
techniques can deal with the examples in this paper.
8. Conclusion
We show new methods for proving differential privacy with ap-
proximate couplings. We take advantage of the full generality of
approximate couplings, showing that the composition principle for
couplings generalizes the standard composition principle for differ-
ential privacy. Our principles support concise and compositional
proofs that are arguably more elegant than existing pen-and-paper
proofs. Although our results are presented from the perspective
of formal verification, we believe that our contributions are also
relevant to the differential privacy communities.
In the future, we plan to use our methods also for the verification
adaptive data analysis algorithms used to prevent false discoveries,
such as the one proposed by Dwork et al. [15], and for the formal
verification of mechanism design [7]. Beyond these examples, the
pointwise characterization of equality can be adapted to stochastic
dominance, and provides a useful tool to further investigate machine-
checked verification of coupling arguments.
It could also be interesting to use the pointwise characterization
of differential privacy to simplify existing formal proofs. For exam-
ple, Barthe et al. [4] prove differential privacy of the vertex cover
algorithm [19]. This algorithm does not use standard primitives;
instead, it samples from a custom distribution specific to the graph.
The existing formal proof uses a custom rule for loops, reasoning
by case analysis on the output of the random samplings. Pointwise
differential privacy could handle this reasoning more elegantly.
Acknowledgments We warmly thank Aaron Roth for challenging
us with the problem of verifying Sparse Vector. We also thank him
and Jonathan Ullman for good discussions about challenges and
subtleties of the proof of Sparse Vector. This work was partially
supported by NSF grants TWC-1513694, CNS-1065060 and CNS-
1237235, by EPSRC grant EP/M022358/1 and by a grant from the
Simons Foundation (#360368 to Justin Hsu).
References
[1] M. Barr. Relational algebras. In S. Mac Lane, editor, Reports of
the Midwest Category Seminar, IV, volume 137 of Lecture Notes
in Mathematics, page 39–55. Springer-Verlag, 1970. URL http:
//www.math.mcgill.ca/barr/papers/relalgs.pdf.
[2] G. Barthe and F. Olmedo. Beyond differential privacy: Composition
theorems and relational logic for f -divergences between probabilistic
programs. In International Colloquium on Automata, Languages
and Programming (ICALP), Riga, Latvia, volume 7966 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 49–60. Springer, 2013. URL
http://certicrypt.gforge.inria.fr/2013.ICALP.pdf.
[3] G. Barthe, B. Grégoire, and S. Zanella-Béguelin. Formal certification
of code-based cryptographic proofs. In ACM SIGPLAN–SIGACT Sym-
posium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), Savannah,
Georgia, pages 90–101, New York, 2009. URL http://research.
microsoft.com/pubs/185309/Zanella.2009.POPL.pdf.
[4] G. Barthe, B. Köpf, F. Olmedo, and S. Zanella-Béguelin. Probabilistic
relational reasoning for differential privacy. ACM Transactions on
Programming Languages and Systems, 35(3):9, 2013. URL http:
//software.imdea.org/~bkoepf/papers/toplas13.pdf.
[5] G. Barthe, M. Gaboardi, E. J. Gallego Arias, J. Hsu, C. Kunz, and P.-Y.
Strub. Proving differential privacy in Hoare logic. In IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), Vienna, Austria, 2014. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.2988.
[6] G. Barthe, T. Espitau, B. Grégoire, J. Hsu, L. Stefanesco, and P.-Y.
Strub. Relational reasoning via probabilistic coupling. In International
Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence and
Reasoning (LPAR), Suva, Fiji, volume 9450, pages 387–401, 2015.
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1509.03476.
[7] G. Barthe, M. Gaboardi, E. J. G. Arias, J. Hsu, A. Roth, and
P. Strub. Computer-aided verification in mechanism design. CoRR,
abs/1502.04052, 2015. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.
04052.
[8] G. Barthe, M. Gaboardi, E. J. Gallego Arias, J. Hsu, A. Roth, and
P.-Y. Strub. Higher-order approximate relational refinement types
for mechanism design and differential privacy. In ACM SIGPLAN–
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL),
Mumbai, India, 2015. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6845.
[9] N. Benton. Simple relational correctness proofs for static analyses and
program transformations. In ACM SIGPLAN–SIGACT Symposium on
Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), Venice, Italy, pages
14–25, 2004. URL http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/
um/people/nick/correctnessfull.pdf.
[10] Y. Chen and A. Machanavajjhala. On the privacy properties of variants
on the sparse vector technique. CoRR, abs/1508.07306, 2015. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.07306.
[11] Y. Deng and W. Du. Logical, metric, and algorithmic characterisations
of probabilistic bisimulation. Technical Report CMU-CS-11-110,
Carnegie Mellon University, March 2011. URL http://arxiv.org/
abs/1103.4577.
[12] C. Dwork and A. Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differen-
tial privacy. Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence, 9(3-4):211–407, 2014. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/
0400000042.
[13] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor.
Our data, ourselves: Privacy via distributed noise generation. In
IACR International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Saint Petersburg, Russia,
pages 486–503. Springer, 2006.
[14] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to
sensitivity in private data analysis. In IACR Theory of Cryptography
Conference (TCC), New York, New York, pages 265–284, 2006. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11681878_14.
[15] C. Dwork, V. Feldman, M. Hardt, T. Pitassi, O. Reingold, and A. Roth.
Preserving statistical validity in adaptive data analysis. In ACM SIGACT
Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), Portland, Oregon, pages
117–126, 2015. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2746539.
2746580.
[16] C. Dwork, M. Naor, O. Reingold, and G. N. Rothblum. Pure differential
privacy for rectangle queries via private partitions. In International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Informa-
tion Security (ASIACRYPT), Auckland, New Zealand, pages 735–751.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. ISBN 978-3-662-48799-0. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_30.
[17] H. Ebadi, D. Sands, and G. Schneider. Differential privacy: Now
it’s getting personal. In ACM SIGPLAN–SIGACT Symposium on
Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), Mumbai, India, pages
69–81, 2015. ISBN 978-1-4503-3300-9. URL http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=2676726.
[18] M. Gaboardi, A. Haeberlen, J. Hsu, A. Narayan, and B. C. Pierce.
Linear dependent types for differential privacy. In ACM SIGPLAN–
SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL),
Rome, Italy, pages 357–370, 2013. URL http://dl.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=2429113.
[19] A. Gupta, K. Ligett, F. McSherry, A. Roth, and K. Talwar. Differentially
private combinatorial optimization. In ACM–SIAM Symposium on
Discrete Algorithms (SODA), Austin, Texas, pages 1106–1125, 2010.
URL http://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.4510v2.
[20] V. T. Hoang and P. Rogaway. On generalized Feistel networks. In
IACR International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), Santa Barbara,
California, volume 6223 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
613–630. Springer, 2010. URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/
301.pdf.
[21] B. Jonsson, W. Yi, and K. G. Larsen. Probabilistic extensions of
process algebras. In Handbook of Process Algebra, pages 685–
710. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2001. URL citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.22.7376.
[22] D. Kozen. Semantics of probabilistic programs. In IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), San Juan, Puerto Rico,
pages 101–114, 1979.
[23] K. G. Larsen and A. Skou. Bisimulation through probabilistic testing.
In ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL),
Austin, Texas, pages 344–352. ACM Press, 1989. URL http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/75277.75307.
[24] T. Lindvall. Lectures on the coupling method. Courier Corporation,
2002.
[25] M. Lyu, D. Su, and N. Li. Understanding the sparse vector technique
for differential privacy. 2016. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.
01699.
[26] F. McSherry. Privacy integrated queries. In ACM SIGMOD Interna-
tional Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), Providence,
Rhode Island, 2009. URL http://research.microsoft.com/
pubs/80218/sigmod115-mcsherry.pdf.
[27] F. McSherry and K. Talwar. Mechanism design via differential
privacy. In IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), Providence, Rhode Island, pages 94–103, 2007. URL http:
//doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2007.41.
[28] I. Mironov. (Not so) random shuffles of RC4. In IACR International
Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), Santa Barbara, California, volume
2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 304–319. Springer,
2002. URL https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/067.pdf.
[29] J. Reed and B. C. Pierce. Distance makes the types grow stronger:
A calculus for differential privacy. In ACM SIGPLAN International
Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP), Baltimore, Maryland,
2010. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1863568.
[30] H. Thorisson. Coupling, Stationarity, and Regeneration. Springer,
2000.
[31] M. C. Tschantz, D. Kaynar, and A. Datta. Formal verification of differ-
ential privacy for interactive systems (extended abstract). Electronic
Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 276(0):61–79, 2011. ISSN
1571–0661. URL http://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.2819v1.
[32] L. Xu, K. Chatzikokolakis, and H. Lin. Metrics for differential
privacy in concurrent systems. In IFIP International Conference on
Formal Techniques for Distributed Objects, Components and Systems
(FORTE), Berlin, Germany, volume 8461 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 199–215, June 2014. URL https://hal.inria.fr/
hal-00879140.
